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21 
Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It 
Possible? 
J.B. Ruhl∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of environmental law provides as good of an 
example as any other field in regulatory law of how successful 
prescriptive regulation has been at meeting public policy 
objectives and how difficult it will be to extend that experience 
much further into the future.  For decades so-called “command-
and-control” regulation has picked the low-hanging fruit—in 
environmental law, for example, it has targeted emissions from 
smokestacks and discharge pipes, disposal of wastes in 
landfills, transportation of hazardous chemicals, and similar 
discrete, easily-identified sources of environmental harm.  Even 
the most conservative cost-benefit analyses confirm that many 
of these initiatives were smashing successes.1  Our nation’s air 
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 1. For example, in March 2005, the White House’s Office of Management 
and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) released the 
results of a cost-benefit analysis conducted of federal rules imposed from 
1994–2004 by nine federal departments and agencies.  OIRA estimates that 
the annual compliance costs of the rules are between $34.8 billion and $39.4 
billion, that the annual social benefits of the rules are between $68.1 billion 
and $259.6 billion, and that most of the costs and benefits are attributable to 
several rules the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated to regulate 
public exposure to fine particulate matter.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 3, 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_2005_cd_report.pdf.  Of 
course, it is not necessarily the case that this is the most efficient outcome.  
RUHL_FINAL_136.DOC 01/09/2006  12:45:08 PM 
22 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:1 
 
and water resources are cleaner, and our lands and roads are 
safer. 
The future that lies ahead for most fields of regulation, 
however, is filled with problems of unwieldy dimensions and 
intractable causes.  In environmental law, for example, the 
problems that are foremost to many observers include the 
invasion of non-native species into ecosystems, the depletion of 
estuarine resources by fertilizer runoff from countless 
agricultural operations hundreds to thousands of miles inland, 
the degradation of habitat from suburban “sprawl,” and the 
evidence of climate change, which itself is irrefutable even if its 
causes are not.2  In this brand of environmental policy 
challenge, there are no discrete sources or clearly traced lines 
of causation.  Rather, problems such as these exhibit the 
hallmark characteristics of complex adaptive systems.3  Their 
behavior emanates from a multitude of diverse, dispersed 
sources responding to coevolving interactions, feedback loops, 
                                                          
Cass Sunstein has observed that “the United States spent no less than $632 
billion for pollution control between 1972 and 1985, and some studies suggest 
that alternative strategies could have achieved the same gains at less than 
one-fifth the cost.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 407, 411 (1990).  Indeed, it is fair to say that by the mid-1990s 
“virtually everyone . . . agree[d] that our historical command-and-control 
approach [was] inefficient and inadequate by itself to carry us where we still 
need to go.”  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 
15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., at viii, viii (1996).  On the other hand, for the view that 
“rigid insistence on making regulations pass cost-benefit tests would, in 
retrospect, have gotten the wrong answer time after time,” see Frank 
Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past 
Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 155, 192 (2005). 
 2. For a survey of these and similar environmental concerns, see JOHN 
COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT 299-804 (2002).  To be sure, it is not as if human societies have 
never before confronted such challenges.  As Jared Diamond observes in his 
sweeping survey of the collapse of human societies, environmental phenomena 
such as climate change and invasive species, and social phenomena, such as 
urban sprawl and trade, have combined many times in the past to cause 
dramatic dislocations of previously successful societies.  See JARED DIAMOND, 
COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 6-10 (2005).  The 
difference today has to do with scale: we have more people, more potent 
technology, and fewer resources per capita than did societies of the past, and 
global interconnections are tighter and far more expansive, meaning problems 
in one region affect potentially many others.  See id. at 8. 
 3. Complex adaptive systems are “macroscopic collections of [interacting] 
units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time.”  PETER COVENEY 
& ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY: THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN 
A CHAOTIC WORLD 7 (1995). 
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and nonlinear cause-and-effect properties.4  They are, to put it 
simply, excruciatingly hard for researchers to understand,5 and 
                                                          
 4. Although the study of such systems can be quite technical in 
substance, many of the recent and most influential works in the field focus on 
applications of the technical theory to real world phenomena, such as 
biological evolution.  See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING 
A PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF SURPRISE (1994); JACK 
COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY 
IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1994); MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE 
JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX (1996); BRIAN 
GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMPLEXITY (1996); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION 
BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED 
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT 
HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND 
COMPLEXITY (1995); RICHARD SOLÉ & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE: HOW 
COMPLEXITY PERVADES BIOLOGY (2000).  Complexity theory and the science of 
complex adaptive systems have radically altered the way in which scientists 
study natural systems as mundane as a dripping faucet and as grand as the 
weather.  See COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 3, at 5-8.  For centuries, the 
classical scientific method has approached such behavior in a reductionist 
manner, intent on studying components of whole complex systems at their 
most irreducible levels.  See id. at 11-14.  Reductionism is based on the 
premise that by understanding how each part works in its simplest form, we 
can understand how the whole system works.  See id. at 432; see also CASTI, 
supra, at 273; COHEN & STEWART, supra, at 33-34.  The advent of high-speed 
computers that allow system modeling at levels of detail never before 
imagined opened the door to the alternative view of systems that complexity 
theory posits.  See generally JOHN L. CASTI, WOULD-BE WORLDS: HOW 
SIMULATION IS CHANGING THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE (1997).  Although it is 
relatively young as a scientific discipline, complexity theory has already 
emerged as an important force in virtually every field of the physical sciences 
as well as in a wide array of the social sciences.  See COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, 
supra note 3, at 5-14.  For histories of the development of complexity theory, 
which has been brought about largely through the efforts of the Santa Fe 
Institute, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); ROGER 
LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS (1992); and M. MITCHELL 
WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND 
CHAOS (1992).  Current information about the field is best obtained from the 
journal Complexity. 
 5. See Brian Walker et al., Resilience Management in Social-Ecological 
Systems: A Working Hypothesis for a Participatory Approach, 6 
CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 14 (2002), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol6/iss1/art14/print.pdf. Describing the 
complex system attributes of natural resources, the authors conclude that 
[t]hese aspects of uncertainty limit the usefulness of forecasting 
methods for the scientific study and management of regions in 
transition.  Given these limits to understanding, we must focus on 
learning to live within systems, rather than “control” them.  One 
might argue that it is impossible to deal with such fundamental limits 
of understanding, and our only reasonable choice is to struggle blindly 
onward. 
Id. 
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thus even harder for law to wrestle under control.6 
                                                          
 6. Jim Salzman and I recently explored the challenge complex adaptive 
systems, including law itself, pose to the development of regulatory policy.  See 
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003).  A 
growing body of legal scholarship uses complex adaptive systems theory and 
the related discipline of chaos theory to inform the design of a broad array of 
legal institutions and policies.  See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock et al., Democracy’s 
Discontent in a Complex World: Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches 
Optimize Michael Sandel’s Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085 
(1997) (critiquing civic republican political theory using complex systems 
principles); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: 
Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996) (using 
chaos theory to evaluate the legislative response to alleged lending 
discrimination); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 
12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 432-35 (1994) (developing a model for legislative 
decisionmaking based on chaos theory); Gerald Andrews Emison, The 
Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and 
Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 192 (1996) 
(applying to ecological protection issues); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, 
Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law 
Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998) (discussing 
complexity theory in the context of corporate structure, management, and 
law); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, 
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 934-35 (1994) (discussing 
the potential significance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); Andrew W. 
Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 764-73 
(1992) (containing a general discussion of chaos theory and its application to 
judicial decisionmaking); Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal 
Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty,” 57 U. MD. L. REV. 380, 
389-93 (1998) (describing the evolution of the tort doctrine of “reasonable 
medical certainty” using complex systems principles); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-65 (1996) 
(describing legal evolution according to path dependence theory and chaotic 
systems theory); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the 
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism 
and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (using 
complexity theory to develop a general behavioral model of the legal system); 
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the 
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (using complexity theory to develop a general 
evolutionary model of the legal system); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The 
Arrow of the Law in Complex Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory 
to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increased Risk the Burgeoning of Law 
Poses to Modern Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997) (using complexity 
theory to describe the direction in which the behavioral and evolutionary 
mechanics are leading the sociolegal system given its current transient state); 
Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 329, 329-31 (1993) (applying chaos theory to the legal dilemma between 
“present justice” and “future justice”); Kenton K. Yee, Coevolution of Law and 
Culture: A Coevolutionary Games Approach, COMPLEXITY, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 4 
(describing attempts to mathematically model evolution of common law 
according to complex adaptive systems dynamics).  Several other works 
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This kind of policy problem thus confounds the prescriptive 
regulation model, because there are no readily available targets 
for the prescriptions and, even worse, we have no idea what 
response the system would exhibit to any particular command.  
Even if legislatures armed them with unlimited powers, 
administrative agencies could not simply command away 
invasive species, or farm runoff, or new rooftops, or global 
climate change.  There is almost universal agreement that 
problems of this sort demand new approaches to regulation.7  
Agencies thus have experimented with many alternatives to 
prescriptive regulation, including market-based programs, 
                                                          
discuss complexity theory or its branches, such as chaos theory, in specific 
legal settings, albeit sometimes very briefly.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 843, 854-59 (1994) (applying chaos theory to capital market 
regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic 
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 581-92 (1994) (discussing the application of chaos 
theory to capital market regulation); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of 
Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 68, 114-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence using, among other methods, a discussion of chaos theory); 
Alistair M. Hanna, The Land Use System, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 538 
(1996) (discussing application of chaos theory and self-organization theory to 
land use regulation system); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 110, 112-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence using chaos theory); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like 
Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1639-40 (1995) (discussing the anti-parasitic 
effect of evolutionary processes as an analogy to democratic processes); 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of 
Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 
25, 46-48 (1993) (discussing chaos theory surfacing in evolutionary biology 
commentary as a metaphor for evolution of environmental law); see also Eric 
Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications 
of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 
452-54, 476 (1997) (focusing on mathematically complex issues as they arise in 
law, such as cyclical priority issues in liens and property titles); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 480-82 
(1997) (advocating an empiricist “systems approach” to legal analysis); Randal 
C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the 
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (using computational 
theories to examine norm competition). 
 7. This is the principal thrust of some of my prior work in environmental 
law—that problems of environmental degradation often behave as complex 
adaptive systems, and thus the law must respond in ways that are adaptive as 
well.  See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 HOU. L. REV. 933 (1997); see also Alastair Iles, 
Adaptive Management: Making Environmental Law and Policy More Dynamic, 
Experimentalist, and Learning, 10 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J., 288, 289-90 (1996). 
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information-based programs, negotiated project-specific 
licensing, ecosystem-scaled land management programs, multi-
party collaborative planning efforts, and government-private 
quasi-partnerships.8  While there remains much debate over 
the effectiveness of this so-called “second generation” of 
regulatory instruments,9 many bright spots exist in their 
relatively short period of implementation,10 and the momentum 
                                                          
 8. For excellent summaries of these alternative regulatory instruments, 
see CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 
(2003) (surveying alternative enforcement and compliance methods); Dennis 
D. Hirsch, Lean and Green?  Environmental Law and Policy for the Flexible 
Production Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611 (2004); Dennis D. Hirsch, Second 
Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard 
B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 437 (2003); and Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001). 
 9. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-
and-Control Efficient?  Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative 
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 
1999 WIS. L. REV. 887; Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project 
XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,527, 10,527-28 (1996). 
 10. The Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading program for 
electric utilities, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990), is 
widely regarded as the most successful example of integration of market 
efficiencies into the command-and-control regulatory structure.  See, e.g., 
Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis 
of the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,411 (1996); Utilities Achieve 100 Percent Compliance with EPA Acid Rain 
Program, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 885 (Aug. 16, 1996); Timothy A. 
Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory 
Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a 
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 491 
(1995).  For an example of the success of information-based approaches to 
environmental regulation, companies subject to the toxic release inventory 
(TRI) reporting provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023, reported the total release of 10.4 billion 
pounds of specified toxic chemicals into the environment in 1987, including 3.9 
billion to landfills, 3.3 billion to other treatment and disposal facilities, 2.7 
billion into the ambient air, and 550 million to surface waters.  By 1995 the 
total reported had fallen to 2.6 billion pounds, and by 1997 it had fallen to 2.57 
billion.  See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 377-78 (3d ed. 2000).  Industry sources have attributed 
the reporting requirement as having galvanized industry into voluntary 
pollution reduction goals that in many cases exceed anything required by law.  
See CMA Initiative Cuts Toxic Emissions 49 Percent Over Six Years, Official 
Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 11 (May 3, 1996).  Reductions have continued.  See 
EPA, EPA TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY DATA FOR REPORTING YEAR 2000 (May 
23, 2002), reprinted in 33 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1229 (May 31, 2002).  For analyses 
of the TRI from the perspective of its information effects, see David W. Case, 
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for more use of these and similar innovations has not abated. 
One attribute that runs commonly through these new tools 
of regulation is their ability to tap into decentralized behavior-
coordinating mechanisms.  Market-based programs, for 
example, replace bureaucratic decisionmaking with basic 
economic incentives to coordinate more efficient decisions by 
private actors about, among other things, how and when to 
emit pollutants.  Information-based programs put information 
about regulated activities into the hands of the public, which 
may use it in ways centralized agencies might not conceive as 
means of pushing individuals, companies, governments, and 
other actors to alter environmentally damaging behavior.  
Ecosystem-scaled land management promotes decisions that 
recognize the holistic, dynamic nature of integrated landscapes, 
rather than having one agency make decisions about trees, 
another about water, and yet another about butterflies.  
Multiparty collaboration puts a more diverse set of interests at 
the negotiating table, thus increasing the chances of creative, 
multifaceted regulatory responses.  And negotiated project-
specific permits allow an agency and an applicant, much like 
parties to a contract, to tailor the conditions attached to 
regulator approval of a particular activity more efficiently than 
could a one-size-fits-all approach to permitting.  In short, the 
decentralized nature of the second generation instruments of 
regulation allows agency policies and decisions to be 
implemented more adaptively, which, it is reasonable to 
believe, will facilitate a more responsive, flexible continuum of 
reactions to the future’s amorphous regulatory challenges. 
To take advantage of their inherently adaptive qualities, 
however, these regulatory instruments must themselves be 
managed adaptively.  It will do no good, in other words, to hand 
an agency a market-based program only to have the agency 
administer the program through centralized decisionmaking.  
Nor is it likely that the now-dominant public land use theme of 
ecosystem management, which focuses on landscapes and 
ecosystem dynamics rather than discrete media or species,11 
                                                          
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and 
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); and Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001). 
 11. Ecosystem management is a relatively new natural resources policy 
model that focuses decisionmaking on the consequences of policy choices to the 
integrity of functioning ecosystems.  See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 2, at  299-
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can successfully be implemented through decisionmaking that 
relies on reductionist, linear models of how “parts” of 
ecosystems function.  Not only must the instruments of 
regulation be transformed, therefore, but so too must the 
methods of regulation.  Hence it is almost universally the case 
that advocates of regulatory innovations also advance the 
method of implementation known generally as adaptive 
management. 12 
Today’s voluminous literature on adaptive management 
traces its roots to Professor C.S. Holling’s seminal work, 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.13  
Although almost thirty years have passed since he and his 
colleagues first described the adaptive management 
methodology, no work on the topic has improved on their core 
theory.  Its essence is an iterative, incremental decisionmaking 
process built around a continuous process of monitoring the 
effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.14  It is, 
                                                          
393 (reviewing the history and content of ecosystem management).  In what 
remains the most authoritative description of the early roots of ecosystem 
management, Grumbine describes ecosystem management as “integrat[ing] 
scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical 
and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem 
integrity over the long term.”  R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem 
Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994). 
 12. For example, there is broad consensus today among resource 
managers and academics that adaptive management is the only practical way 
to implement ecosystem management policy.  See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim 
W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosystem Management, 11 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); Anne E. Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem 
Management—Principles for Practical Application, 6 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 730 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive Management Design 
for Ecosystem Monitoring, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 745 (1996).  Indeed, 
the Ecological Society of America’s comprehensive study of ecosystem 
management treats the use of adaptive management methods as a given.  See 
Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America 
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 665 (1996). 
 13. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. 
Holling ed., 1978).  It is universally agreed that adaptive management theory 
traces its origins to Holling’s influential work.  See, e.g., Kai N. Lee & Jody 
Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin 
Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the 
term “adaptive management” to Holling’s book).  For more background on 
Holling’s contribution to the discipline of adaptive management, see NAGLE & 
RUHL, supra note 2, at 334–38. 
 14. The biologist Simon Levin recently defined adaptive management 
concisely as “maintaining flexibility in management structures and adjusting 
rules and regimes on the basis of monitoring and other sources of new data.” 
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in other words, far more suited to the needs of future 
regulatory challenges than is prescriptive regulation. 
My focus, however, is not on what adaptive management 
should be, but on whether it can be.  Recently, for example, the 
National Research Council branch of the National Academy of 
Sciences, at the request of several federal agencies, convened a 
committee of scientists to explore how adaptive management 
might be used to improve resource agency decisionmaking in 
the Klamath River Basin, which straddles southern Oregon 
and northern California (Klamath Committee).15  The 
Committee outlined eight steps of adaptive management: (1) 
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and 
objectives for management of ecosystems, (3) determination of 
the ecosystem baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, 
(5) selection of future restoration actions, (6) implementation of 
management actions, (7) monitoring and ecosystem response, 
and (8) evaluation of restoration efforts and proposals for 
remedial actions.16  The Committee’s description of the last 
stage provides some flavor of how adaptive management differs 
from prescriptive regulation: 
                                                          
SIMON LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION 200 (1999); see also Simon A. Levin, 
Towards a Science of Ecological Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 6  
(1999) (discussing Holling’s arguments), available at 
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art6.  A more detailed description is found in 
a recent report by the National Academy of Science’s research arm, the 
National Research Council, in its investigation of the Missouri River 
ecosystem: 
The concept of adaptive management promotes the notion that 
management policies should be flexible and should incorporate new 
information as it becomes available.  New management actions 
should build upon the results of previous experiments in an iterative 
process.  It stresses the continuous use of scientific information and 
monitoring to help organizations and policies change appropriately to 
achieve specific environmental and social objectives. 
COMMISSION ON MO. RIVER ECOSYSTEM SCI., WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., DIV. ON 
EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER 
ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 18–19 (2002) 
[hereinafter MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM], available at 
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309083141/html. 
 15. See COMMITTEE ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE 
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY, DIV. ON 
EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND 
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND 
STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY (2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090970/html.  In the interests of full disclosure: 
I was a member of the so-called “Klamath Committee.” 
 16. See id. at 332-35. 
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After implementation of specific restoration activities and procedures, 
the status of the ecosystem is regularly and systematically reassessed 
and described.  Comparison of the new state with the baseline state is 
a measure of progress toward objectives.  The evaluation process 
feeds directly into adaptive management by informing the 
implementation team and leading to testing of management 
hypotheses, new simulations, and proposals for adjustments in 
management experiments or development of wholly new experiments 
or management strategies.17 
As Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman suggest in their 
review of regulatory innovations,18 this form of decisionmaking 
allows agencies to learn about and respond to changing 
conditions at the “back end” rather than loading all 
decisionmaking at the “front end,” when the effects of decisions 
and of other changing conditions are not yet known.19  This 
“front-end/back-end” distinction captures the essence of 
adaptive management, and thus, can be used to identify the 
features of any regulatory program that hold potential for 
adaptive management implementation.  The more a program 
directs administrative action toward fixing long-term policies 
and decisions based on pre-regulatory analysis, the more “front-
end” it is.  Adaptive management requires institutionalization 
of monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental 
policy and decision adjustments at the “back end,” where 
performance results can be evaluated and the new information 
can be fed back into the ongoing regulatory process.  Deliberate 
monitoring and a framework for altering course, rapidly and 
frequently if conditions warrant, thus are essential ingredients 
of adaptive management. 
On the one hand, nothing about this is startlingly new or 
unusual as a general means of decisionmaking—businesses 
implement adaptive management all the time, or they perish.  
Ironically, however, the puzzle is whether administrative 
agencies can behave adaptively and survive.  As a leading 
                                                          
 17. Id. at 335. 
 18. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION 
AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 
42 [hereinafter Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective]. 
 19. Their work demonstrates the folly of attempts “to perfect regulation 
on the ‘front end’ by subjecting proposed policies to careful scrutiny using cost-
benefit analysis and other similar techniques,” arguing instead for methods 
that “improve policy on the ‘back end’ by engaging in incremental adjustments 
of policy as new information is obtained about how the policy affects the real 
world.”  Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note 18, at 43. 
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proponent of adaptive management once observed, agencies 
“have not often been rewarded for flexibility, openness, and 
their willingness to experiment, monitor, and adapt.”20  The 
deterrents to these core attributes of adaptive management 
come from three fronts: legislatures, the public, and the courts.  
In short, in order for adaptive management to flourish in 
administrative agencies, legislatures must empower them to do 
it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts must 
resist the temptation to second-guess when they do in fact do it.  
The track record of administrative law from the era of 
prescriptive regulation suggests that none of these three 
institutional constraints will yield easily.  Quite simply, there 
is good reason to doubt whether regulation by adaptive 
management is possible without substantial change in 
administrative law.21 
In this Article, I explore this concern using the example of 
the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA)22 Habitat Conservation 
                                                          
 20. R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem 
Management?”, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 45 (1997). 
 21. This view is shared by the few other commentators who have done 
exploratory work in the field.  See, e.g., Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to 
the Restoration of Aquatic Systems and the Utilization of Adaptive 
Management, 23 VT. L. REV. 177, 188 (1998) (“Can adaptive management work 
within our current legal framework?”); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” 
Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) (“Institutional 
structures and arrangements, in particular, have repeatedly been fingered as 
key impediments to realizing the promise of adaptive management.”); see also 
Iles, supra note 7, at 301 (“It is difficult to imagine existing Australian law 
imposing means to continuously monitor environmental changes and actively 
altering remedies to reflect those changes.”).  By and large, however, although 
support for adaptive management is legion and literature on implementation 
theory abounds, from what I can tell very few commentators from science or 
law are asking whether it can succeed in the conventional administrative law 
system. 
 22. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).  
Elsewhere I have explored whether the Act as a whole reflects adaptive 
management qualities.  See J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management 
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1249 
(2004).  Here, I use the ESA as a case study to examine the constraints 
conventional administrative law places on adaptive management in general.  
Like the other work, this Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the ESA.  Rather, it uses the ESA as a case study to focus 
attention on the potential obstacles conventional administrative law poses to 
the realization of adaptive management principles and techniques in 
regulatory contexts.  For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of 
which are referred to frequently infra, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. 
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997); 
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Plan (HCP) program.23  Section 9 of the ESA generally 
prohibits any act that would injure or kill an animal that is of a 
species the federal government has designated as in danger of 
extinction.24  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which 
administers the ESA for terrestrial and freshwater species, has 
interpreted section 9 to extend to any habitat modification that 
leads to actual death or injury of an endangered species.25  The 
effect of that interpretation is that many land development 
projects around the nation would violate section 9, except that 
section 10 of the ESA provides authority for FWS to issue 
permits for “incidental take” of protected species—that is, take 
which is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity.26  To obtain 
such a permit, an applicant prepares a “conservation plan,” 
which has come to be known as a habitat conservation plan 
(and thus HCP), demonstrating compliance with a variety of 
criteria.27 
Through a series of events described in more detail below, 
FWS implemented the HCP permit program very much in the 
                                                          
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur 
& Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; 
LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENVTL. LAW INST., ENDANGERED 
SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT (2001); and TONY A. SULLINS, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
(2001). 
 23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1).  This Article also is not intended to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the ESA’s HCP program.  For a more complete 
description of the mechanics of the HCP program, see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill 
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act 
“HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999). 
 24. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C). For a description of the cases developing 
the legal standards for what constitutes “take,” see Gina Guy, Take 
Prohibitions and Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22, 
at 191; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 22, at 39–46; Steven P. Quarles & 
Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife 
Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22, at 207; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra 
note 22, at 104–12; SULLINS, supra note 22, at 44–54; and Alan M. Glen & 
Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 
16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001).  For a description of the process for 
identifying, or “listing,” species as endangered or threatened, see LIEBESMAN 
& PETERSEN, supra note 22, at 15–20; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The 
Keystone of Species Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 22, at 19; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 22, at 38–58; and  
SULLINS, supra note 22, at 11–25. 
 25. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2004). 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 27. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
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model of a negotiated site-specific permitting program 
combined with a market-based mechanism for compensation of 
habitat impacts.  Moreover, the agency announced its resolve to 
implement the program using an adaptive management 
approach.  While the effort produced some initial success, 
ambiguous legislative delegation of authority, aggressive 
interest group opposition, and skeptical courts have all kept the 
HCP program mired in the swamp of old school prescriptive 
regulation.  There is probably no regulatory program more in 
need of adaptive management than the conservation of 
endangered species, yet the adaptive energy is being sucked 
dry from the HCP program by the institutions of 
administrative law. 
How can this have come to be, and what can be done to 
improve the overall situation of adaptive management in 
administrative law?  Part I of this Article briefly places those 
questions in the general background of interest—the potential 
for collision between adaptive management theory and 
administrative law institutions—to more firmly illustrate the 
nature of the problem.  Part II then grounds the topic in a real-
world context through the story of the HCP program.  Although 
Congress appears to have hoped that the HCP program would 
promote adaptive management of imperiled species, its 
delegation of authority to FWS was an imprint of prescriptive 
regulation.  Nevertheless, during the 1990s, while Congress 
was functionally inert on reform of the ESA despite much 
rhetorical enthusiasm, FWS essentially reinvented the 
program through administrative reform in the mold of adaptive 
management.  Soon, however, citizen groups representing 
environmentalist interests responded with vociferous and 
litigious opposition to reform, ultimately bearing down on the 
agency’s injection of “flexibility” into the program through 
repeated lawsuits challenging HCP permits.  With few (but 
notable) exceptions, the courts were all too quick to pounce as 
well, stifling the agency’s willingness to experiment.  The result 
could be one of the tragedies of environmental and 
administrative law.  Today, the HCP program increasingly 
resembles a plain vanilla regulatory program: functional, but 
increasingly stripped of its once promising adaptive qualities.  
One can only hope this is not a harbinger for the future of 
adaptive management in general.  If it is, regulation by 
adaptive management will not be possible. 
In the long run, however, the need to use adaptive 
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approaches will not diminish—if anything, it will only increase.  
Thus the pressure to reform administrative law will be 
unyielding.  As gloomy as the prospects for adaptive 
management appear today, regulation by adaptive 
management is inevitable.  But knowing this makes it tempting 
to cast aside the conventions of administrative law too quickly.  
The process of making regulation more adaptive should itself 
implement the adaptive management approach.  Before we 
change anything about administrative law, we need first to 
define the problem, set objectives, assess the baseline, and 
formulate models.  Hence this Article closes by suggesting a 
basic model to use in thinking about regulation by adaptive 
management. 
I. ADAPTING TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
The Klamath Committee’s list of the eight stages of 
adaptive management gives the false impression that adaptive 
management is a linear checklist with a beginning and an end.  
Rather, adaptive management is a cyclical decisionmaking 
process.  For example, consolidating the eight stages into four 
core functions, adaptive management looks like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the logical starting point for introduction of this 
form of adaptive management into any particular policy 
solution is the definition of problem and objectives, there is no 
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logical terminus.  Particularly for problems such as invasive 
species—which we are unlikely ever fully to eradicate—
adaptive management, once started, anticipates literally 
endless application.  All along the way, cycle after cycle, 
countless decisions are made about what the problem entails, 
what the objectives are, which models seem best suited, how 
and when to implement management actions, which 
performance metrics to measure, and what to do when things 
do not go as planned.  As new information continuously enters 
the stream of decisions, sound management may require an 
agency practicing adaptive management to replace objectives, 
models, or performance criteria “on the fly.”28 
To anyone familiar with conventional administrative law, 
this sounds nothing like what actually happens.29  With broad 
latitude to delegate legislative power and processes to 
administrative agencies, legislatures intending to regulate 
behavior through administrative institutions exhibit a 
spectrum of approaches from open-ended mandates to 
micromanaged authority. But one truly searches in vain for 
legislation that establishes anything like the decisionmaking 
cycle of adaptive management.  Instead, most administrative 
agencies increasingly are required to engage in a tremendous 
amount of foreplay before promulgating a rule or adjudicating a 
decision.  Most of this pre-decisional activity is geared toward 
serving two goals: public participation and judicial review.  
Interest groups enter the process primarily through notice and 
comment opportunities, rights of participation in 
administrative hearings, and actions for judicial review of 
administrative actions.  Courts engaging in such judicial review 
defer to agencies in many aspects of substantive outcome, but 
nonetheless demand thorough explanations of the rationales for 
agency decisions, take a “hard look” at how the agencies 
connect the dots, and show little tolerance for any procedural 
                                                          
 28. As Holly Doremus aptly sums up, “A management program cannot be 
adaptive unless decisions are always subject to re-evaluation in light of new 
information.”  Doremus, supra note 21, at 55. 
 29. This paragraph is not intended to provide a complete exposition on the 
plodding, inefficient nature of conventional administrative law.  Jim Salzman 
and I have done so, and have pointed to the extensive body of literature on the 
topic in J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem 
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 Geo. L.J. 757 (2003).  
Shapiro and Glicksman review it ably in their work on the “front end/back 
end” distinction.  Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note 
18, at 42-43. 
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slips. 
It is little wonder that, having to operate in an atmosphere 
in which each decision involves so much “front-end” 
preparation designed largely in anticipation of the onslaught of 
the public’s “participation” and judges’ “hard looks,” many 
agencies display an aversion to adaptation.  For example, a 
recent study of over 392 federal agency rules issued in 
November and December 2003 found that the mean number of 
days to completion of the final rule from date of first proposal 
was 322.30  If public comments were presented, the mean period 
increased to 414 days.31  If the agency made any significant 
changes from the proposal to the final rule—in other words, 
adapted to the public comments—the mean time was 472 
days.32  As this demonstrates, a single instance of adaptation in 
the course of a rulemaking can add about 150 days to the 
agency’s decision timeline.33 
More broadly, a recent General Accounting Office report 
found that innovative environmental regulation by the states 
faced significant obstacles at the federal level because of 
“cultural resistance among many in [the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)] toward alternative approaches” and 
the lack of “explicit language authorizing the use of innovative 
environmental approaches.”34  State officials reported that the 
resistance from EPA “often manifested itself in a lengthy and 
costly EPA review of their proposals.”35  Bottom line: 
                                                          
 30. See Stuart Shapiro, Two Months in the Life of the Regulatory State, 30 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2005, at 12, 15 tbl.5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. The empirical study demonstrates that rulemaking is, in general, a 
skewed process, with relatively few rules.  Those rules with general 
application affecting significant social or economic interests receive most of the 
public comments and agency time.  But public comment adds time even in the 
median case:  the median time for completion for all rules was 175 days; the 
median for rules with comments was 285 days; and the median for rules that 
changed significantly in response to comments was 366 days.  See id.  Agency 
adaptation in the median case added almost 200 days, even longer in the 
mean case.  See id. 
 34. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO INNOVATIVE STATE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 3 
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02268.pdf. 
 35. Id.; see also David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a 
New Look to Our "Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our 
Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 376 & n.124 
(1994) (noting the New York environmental agency's view that changes in the 
“regulatory culture” at the federal level are needed to facilitate effective 
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adaptation in the current milieu takes time and resources, with 
little payoff, so why bother? 
With this general experience in mind, it would seem 
unreasonable, even cruel, to command agencies to engage in 
adaptive management of their rulemaking and other 
decisionmaking without changing the rules of the game.  Given 
that adaptive management contemplates a continuous cycle of 
decisions, decisions many of which under conventional 
administrative law would trigger the full-blown process 
described above, the adaptive management decision cycle would 
rotate slowly and painfully. 
Today agencies are under pressure to act more efficiently 
and flexibly with no explicit adaptive management framework 
for doing so.  As a result, agencies must search through their 
inventories of authority for every possible opportunity to adjust 
their objectives, models, management actions, and performance 
criteria without opening the door to the flood of citizen suits 
and judicial glares.  At best, they may cobble together some set 
of tools that they can, with some sense of credibility, think of as 
adaptive management and hope nobody notices what they are 
doing.36 
Despite these efforts, over time agencies will find that 
interest groups and courts relentlessly will peck away at 
adaptive agency behavior, using all the armament that 
conventional administrative law puts at their disposal.  A 
stunning example comes from the litigation over the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers’ management of the Missouri River 
navigation and flow regime system.  The background is long 
and complex,37 but a recent crescendo came when a court 
rejected Missouri’s claim, one among many, that the Corps had 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)38 by 
                                                          
operation of the cooperative federalism system of environmental law). 
 36. For a discussion of the places agencies might look for such authorities, 
see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through 
Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004). 
 37. For comprehensive backgrounds, see MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM, 
supra note 14, at 1-106; John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri 
River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Functions and Legal 
Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 817-862 (2001); and also South Dakota v. 
Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 38. NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all “major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”  
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). 
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adopting an adaptive management approach.39  The Corps’ 
“victory” sowed the seeds of a long future of litigation: 
Adaptive management is an approach to natural resources 
management in which policy choices are made incrementally.  As 
each choice is made, data on the effects of these choices are collected 
and analyzed in order to assess whether to retain, reverse, or 
otherwise alter the policy choice.  Missouri maintains that the 
adaptive management approach violates NEPA because it permits the 
Corps to circumvent the NEPA process when policy choices are 
modified.  Missouri takes issue with the potential flow changes that 
the Corps may undertake in the future.  Missouri fails to point to any 
evidence that indicates that the Corps intends to avoid its NEPA 
obligations by implementing this adaptive management approach.  To 
the contrary, the Corps acknowledges that in the event a major policy 
change results, the Corps will be required to comply with NEPA.  
Absent evidence that the adaptive management process actually 
results in the Corps’ evasion of NEPA obligations, the Court declines 
to declare this approach invalid.40 
In other words, the Corps did not err in law by adopting 
adaptive management as its implementation method; rather, it 
erred in sensibility by doing so, because it opened the door to 
litigation over whether each policy adjustment triggers NEPA.  
One might wonder how pleased the Corps was to have 
prevailed on those terms. 
Indeed, recent NEPA decisions by the Supreme Court 
highlight the perverse disincentives in conventional 
administrative law that hinder adaptive decisionmaking of the 
kind the Corps has flirted with.  In Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance41 and Department of Transportation v. 
Public Citizen,42 the Court established in no uncertain terms 
that if an agency lacks discretion over some aspect of an action, 
or has reached a decision within its discretion and divested 
itself of further discretion to alter the decision, NEPA does not 
apply.  This principle benefits an agency in a “front-end” world 
of administrative law, allowing it to dodge the NEPA bullet, 
but it provides a strong disincentive to establishing and 
retaining long-term adaptive management programs.  After all, 
                                                          
 39. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145 
(D. Minn. 2004), aff’d, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 40. Id. at 1163-64 (citations omitted); see also Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Washington, No. 03-075, 2004 WL 322135 
(Wash. Poll. Control Bd. Feb. 13, 2004) (expressing skepticism over whether 
the agency’s use of adaptive management satisfied legal standards and 
requiring evidentiary hearing). 
 41. 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
 42. 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 
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continuing discretion to alter a decision is the essence of 
adaptive management.  Thus, the clear message to agencies 
under conventional administrative law is that they adopt 
adaptive management at their own peril.  Adopting adaptive 
management may be an agency’s dream; practicing it is a 
nightmare.  This sobering conclusion is confirmed by the HCP 
experience. 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HCP ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENT 
Generally, land use regulation has long been a breeding 
ground of “front-end” approaches to regulatory decisionmaking, 
and thus is likely to be resistant to change.  As Holly Doremus 
summarizes the field: 
Our dominant paradigm for regulation of private land development is 
one-time review prior to a proposed action.  Proposals for timber 
harvests, subdivision development, or wetlands filling are either 
approved or disapproved.  If they are approved, we are accustomed to 
that being the end of the story.  We have very little history of 
continuing oversight of private land management, requiring changes 
over time if our preliminary assessment of the likely environmental 
impacts proves inaccurate.43 
For example, although the ESA explicitly recognizes the 
importance of ecosystem integrity to imperiled species,44 its 
species-focused statutory structure does little to address that 
connection in any positive law sense.45  As our understanding of 
the complexities of species decline and its relation to ecosystem 
change has advanced tremendously since the early 1970s, 
increasingly we are finding the ESA ill-equipped to handle the 
task for which it was intended.  One of the first such struggles 
for the ESA was what to do about private land uses that 
disturb or destroy habitat occupied by endangered species.  
Other than the section 9 prohibition of take, there was no 
provision in the original enactment addressing such situations.  
Yet as urban growth increasingly encroached upon species 
habitat, the need for a permit-based option became more 
pressing.  A development project at San Bruno Mountain on 
California’s San Francisco Peninsula brought this issue to a 
                                                          
 43. Doremus,  supra note 21, at 55. 
 44. One purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved.”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). 
 45. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven 
Degrees of Relevance, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 156 (2000). 
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head when a habitat for an endangered butterfly was ground 
zero for the prime development property.46  Thus began the rise 
and fall of the HCP adaptive management experiment. 
A. LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE 
With this San Bruno Mountain development directly in 
mind, Congress in 1982 amended the ESA to create the HCP 
program in section 10(a)(1).47  The legislative history makes it 
clear that Congress had intended a flexible program that would 
“encourage creative partnerships between the public and 
private sectors.”48 
As a delegation of regulatory authority, however, section 
10(a)(1) does little to implement “creativity” and less to 
encourage adaptive management.  The program is structured 
around a “front-end” process designed to reach long-term 
predictions about project impacts on species.  To approve a 
permit, for example, the agency must find that the HCP 
ensures that “the applicant will, to the maximum extent 
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking,” 
and that “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood 
of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”49  
Although FWS may impose “terms and conditions” in the 
permit, “including, but not limited to, such reporting 
requirements as the [agency] deems necessary for determining 
whether such terms and conditions are being complied with,”50 
it is not always practical for FWS to embed adaptive 
management monitoring and reporting into permits through 
this authority.  In many cases, the harm to the species that 
prompts the need for an HCP permit occurs only in the 
construction phase of a project.  It is not clear from the 
statutory structure how FWS could exercise adaptive 
management adjustments based on new information that 
becomes available during the operational phase of such a 
project.  Thus, the overall statutory version of the HCP 
program leaves much to be desired when it comes to 
                                                          
 46. The project background is described in Friends of Endangered Species, 
Inc.  v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 ( 9th Cir. 1985). 
 47. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 
96 Stat. 1411, 1422-25 (1982). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 30 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2871. 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iv) (2000). 
 50. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
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establishing a cohesive adaptive management framework. 
Although the San Bruno Mountain HCP was successfully 
concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, very little else happened 
under section 10(a)(1) over the next decade.51  The politics of 
the ESA changed all of that in the early 1990s, as the 
regulatory reinvention movement52 spread to the ESA.  The 
result was an injection of adaptive management into the HCP 
program through administrative reform rather than legislative 
initiative.53 
As the new Secretary of the Interior under the incoming 
Clinton Administration, Bruce Babbitt was caught between a 
rock and a hard place when he inherited the ESA.  The 
statute’s reputation had reached a low point in the Republican-
controlled Congress, while at the same time, many 
environmental protection interest groups were poised to 
condemn any effort that would, in their view, weaken the 
statute.54  To fend off both fronts, Babbitt embarked on a two-
part agenda focused on enhancing species conservation through 
greater emphasis on ecosystems, and on providing greater 
balance to landowners on whose property the imperiled species 
are found.55 
                                                          
 51. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only twelve HCP permits, 
whereas it had issued 225 by October 1, 1997.  LAURA C. HOOD, DEFENDERS 
OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, at vi–xiii (1998) available at 
http://www.defenders.org/pubs/hcp02.html.  For background on these 
developments and the HCP program in general, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The 
Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,592 (1999); 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in 
Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997); Robert D. Thornton, 
Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001); Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat 
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the 
Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996); and Albert C. Lin, 
Comment, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and 
Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996). 
 52. See PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, 
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1995), reprinted in Daily Env’t 
Rep. (BNA), at E-1 (Mar. 17, 1995), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/rsreport/251a.html. 
 53. I have previously reviewed some of the events discussed infra from the 
perspective of adaptive management.  See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 1273-80. 
 54. For a more thorough account of the political factors that set the stage, 
see John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A 
Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 208–12 (2000). 
 55. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative 
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The most prominent example of the impact this approach 
had on the ESA is the life it breathed into the HCP program, 
causing it to be lauded as “a sweeping new approach to 
protecting endangered species.”56  By treating HCPs as a 
“thrash it out” form of contract negotiation,57 Babbitt turned 
the administrative version of the HCP program into a “back-
end” approach for resolving the ever-increasing instances of 
collision between the ESA take prohibition and urban growth.  
Landowners increasingly participated in site-specific HCP 
negotiations as a practical means of resolving ESA issues with 
lasting certainty,58 while the agency increasingly promoted the 
ecosystem scale of the program.59  The number of HCP permits 
began to grow in the early 1990s,60 and with experience, the 
agency added structure and standards to the program while 
retaining the flexibility to accommodate the changing needs of 
species and landowners.61  HCP permits began to proliferate 
under Babbitt’s tenure, with several hundred having been 
approved by the end of his term.62 
                                                          
Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 388–400 
(1998) (providing a survey of policies serving this purpose).  For an insider’s 
account providing a thoughtful perspective on the strategic approach the 
Babbitt administration took, see Leshy, supra note 54, at 212–14. 
 56. Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 38 
(2001). 
 57. See Bruce Babbitt, Address to the National Press Club Luncheon (July 
17, 1996), quoted in Thornton, supra note 51, at 95. 
 58. Several commentators have stressed the negotiation-based character 
of the HCP program.  See Farber, supra note 56, at 43; Hsu, supra note 51, at 
10,594–600; Ruhl, supra note 23, at 391–96. 
 59. See Thornton, supra note 51, at 94–95. 
 60. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS & 
AMERICAN INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT 
CONSERVATIONS PLANS 6 (1999) [hereinafter USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANS], available at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-
web/projects/97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf.  In the interests of full disclosure: 
during this timeframe I was engaged in private practice and frequently 
represented applicants for HCP permits. 
 61. For example, the FWS has published a lengthy handbook describing 
the steps required to obtain an HCP permit.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & 
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK], 
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/hcp/hcpbook.html. 
 62. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: 
SECTION 10 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2002), available at 
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCP_Incidental_Take.pdf.  For a running 
count, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GENERAL STATISTICS FOR 
ENDANGERED SPECIES, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TessStatReport (last 
updated Oct. 24, 2005).  For an excellent statistical summary of the 208 HCP 
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In addition to adopting a contract negotiation model for 
HCPs, FWS promoted a market-based approach for habitat 
mitigation requirements that are made conditions of particular 
HCP permits.63  The central topic of the negotiations for HCPs 
is what habitat the applicant will “trade” in return for the 
habitat that will be impaired as a result of the development 
project.  Turning from this barter approach to a program even 
closer to market-based mechanisms, FWS recently developed a 
policy for the “banking” of endangered species habitat64 
modeled on the more mature version of habitat banking found 
in the wetlands protection program under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act.65  As a logical extension of the HCP program, 
habitat banking allows some landowners to assemble and 
restore significant holdings of prime habitat for listed species 
and to market “credits” in the habitat to other landowners in 
need of mitigation habitat to satisfy their HCP permit 
                                                          
permits that the FWS had issued nationally by August 1997, including 
acreage statistics, see USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS, 
supra note 60. 
 63. Mitigation for impacts to endangered species or their habitat can be 
achieved through “compensating for the impact,” such as through restoring or 
protecting habitat at an onsite or offsite location.  See HCP HANDBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 3-19 to 3-20. 
 64. See Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of 
Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,753 (May 8, 2003). 
 65. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of 
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (Nov. 28, 1995) (clarifying the manner 
in which mitigation banks may be used to satisfy mitigation requirements of 
the Clean Water Act).  Although the Corps has long applied a mitigation policy 
to regulated fill of jurisdictional wetlands, initially that policy focused on, even 
preferred, mitigation on the site of the project seeking a section 404 permit.  
Over time, however, the Corps found that the onsite mitigation preference led 
to a proliferation of “postage stamp” mitigation sites that presented serious 
administrative monitoring and enforcement concerns.  Indeed, many studies 
have shown that onsite mitigation generally failed to produce compensatory 
wetland resource values.  See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NEW 
ENGLAND DIST., SUCCESS OF CORPS-REQUIRED WETLAND MITIGATION IN NEW 
ENGLAND (2003); WASHINGTON DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE 
WETLAND MITIGATION EVALUATION STUDY (2002);  NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. PROT., CREATING INDICATORS OF WETLAND STATUS (QUANTITY AND 
QUALITY): FRESHWATER WETLAND MITIGATION IN NEW JERSEY (2002).  
Consequently, during the 1990s the Corps gradually moved first to an offsite 
compensatory mitigation policy, and eventually toward the mitigation banking 
concept, officially blessing it in the 1995 multi-agency policy laying out the 
basic design and implementation standards.  For a comprehensive overview of 
the wetlands mitigation banking program and comparison of it to endangered 
species habitat banking approaches, see Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, 
Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation Tool, 30 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,537 (2000). 
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conditions.  The conservation values accruing to the species 
within the banked habitat area are translated by the 
regulatory authority into quantified “credits,” and each 
development project’s negative impacts to the species are 
quantified through the permitting process into mitigation 
needs or “debits.”  The debit holders can retire their regulatory 
“debt” by purchasing an offsetting number of credits from an 
owner of a bank located within a specified geographic area, 
with the market, rather then the regulators, determining the 
price of the credits.  Presumably, bank owners enter the 
banking enterprise because they believe their cost of generating 
credits through land acquisition and resource management will 
be more than amply recovered in the credit market.  
Meanwhile, projects in need of regulatory approvals can 
purchase bank credits as a means of satisfying mitigation 
requirements in a manner that is less expensive than other 
measures such as dedicating project lands or purchasing and 
managing conservation lands directly.  Thus, a supply of and 
demand for credits should emerge.  To make this a three-way 
win, regulatory agencies believe that conservation banking is 
good for the species as well, as it promotes a more orderly 
system for securing permanently dedicated conservation lands 
and attracts persons with true expertise to the “industry” of 
creating and managing those lands.  It is common, therefore, to 
hear conservation banking described as “a free-market 
enterprise that offers landowners economic incentives to 
protect natural resources, saves developers time and money by 
providing them with certainty of pre-approved compensation 
lands, and provides long-term protection of habitat.”66  
Although there has yet to be any substantial experience under 
the new program, it appears the FWS has developed a flexible 
framework for habitat banking that meets the expectations of 
many environmentalists and landowners.67 
                                                          
 66. Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation 
Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. at 24,753. 
 67. In 2000, Bean and Dwyer, both of Environmental Defense, offered 
many thoughtful principles for construction of an endangered species habitat 
banking program, even drafting a proposed policy, and the program the FWS 
has developed incorporates many of their guidelines.  Compare Bean & Dwyer, 
supra note 65, at 10,546–56, with Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and 
Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. at 24,753.  To be sure, 
implementing banking programs, particularly habitat-based banking 
programs, poses significant challenges to ensure appropriate environmental 
results.  But, if carefully constructed and monitored, they are promising in 
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The design of HCPs as negotiated regulatory instruments 
that take advantage of market-based mitigation led naturally 
to an adaptive management theme.  Indeed, not long after the 
HCP permit program was fully on its feet, FWS announced it 
would henceforth administer permits under the ESA by using 
adaptive management as a means to “examine alternative 
strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and 
objectives through research and/or monitoring, and then, if 
necessary, to adjust future conservation management actions 
according to what is learned.”68  FWS thus portrayed adaptive 
management as an important practical tool that “can assist the 
Services and the applicant in developing an adequate operating 
conservation program and improving its effectiveness.”69  FWS 
also intended adaptive management to foster continuing 
relations between the parties after issuance of the incidental 
take permit, serving the agencies’ goal of promoting long-term, 
collaborative “conservation partnerships” with landowners.70  
                                                          
that regard.  For a thorough review of the promise and pitfalls of habitat 
banking programs generally, see James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and 
the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
 68. Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for 
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 
Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486 (Mar. 9, 1999).  Accordingly, HCPs are acknowledged 
to be working hypotheses of how species will respond to changes in habitat 
size, location, configuration, and quality.  To truly integrate adaptive 
management into an HCP, the plan must include a monitoring program to 
evaluate the performance of mitigation measures and a system that 
automatically triggers alternative conservation actions in the event that 
performance fails to meet conservation goals.  See Gregory A. Thomas, Where 
Property Rights and Biodiversity Converge Part III: Incorporating Adaptive 
Management and the Precautionary Principle into HCP Design, 18 
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 32, 34–35 (2001); George F. Wilhere, Adaptive 
Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20 
(2002). 
 69. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for 
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 
Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000).  For an in-depth discussion of the 
integration of adaptive management into the HCP program during Babbitt’s 
tenure, see Doremus, supra note 21, at 68–74. 
 70. As one FWS official has explained: 
We will continue to incorporate contingency planning within all types 
of HCPs.  In the future, HCPs will have improved structure in their 
adaptive management strategies. . . . Increased structure in adaptive 
management strategies will require increased vigilance on the part of 
permittees and the Service during implementation of long-term plans; 
this reflects the nature of the conservation partnership created by 
HCPs. 
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And for environmentalists, adaptive management, if faithfully 
implemented, can be used to offset information gaps by 
building more robust monitoring, evaluation, and revision 
processes into the permit.71 
As a result, although Congress clearly did not install 
adaptive management as the method of implementation for 
HCPs, the ambiguity it left in the statute gave Babbitt the 
room the agency needed to do so through administrative 
reform.  While the initiative surely would have been on firmer 
ground had the statute even so much as mentioned adaptive 
management, the enthusiastic response of landowners to the 
reformed HCP program suggested that Congress would have 
little complaint about what the agency had accomplished.  In 
short, had it come to its full fruition, the integration of adaptive 
management in the HCP process, which is by no means 
required or even signaled in the statute, would have truly 
marked HCPs as “a system of negotiation rather than one of 
unilateral federal imposition on landowners.”72  Alas, that is far 
from the end of the story. 
B. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
While FWS was patting itself on the back for its foray into 
adaptive management, widespread concern surfaced among 
environmental protection interests about how the agency 
implemented the adaptive management theme.73  The major 
sore spot was the perceived lack of meaningful public 
                                                          
Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., 
July/Aug 2000, at 4, 7.  To be sure, adaptive management, to be implemented, 
does not require establishing collaborative relations between regulators and 
other interested parties.  Most adaptive management advocates, however, 
portray it as most effective when it is housed in a collaborative framework.  
See generally BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: BALANCING INTERESTS THROUGH 
ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT (Louise E. Buck et al. eds., 2001). 
 71. See Thomas, supra note 68, at 36 (suggesting that where information 
critical to the HCP design is scarce or uncertain, the HCP should be shorter in 
duration, cover a smaller area, avoid irreversible impacts, require that 
mitigation measures be accomplished before take is allowed, include 
contingencies, and have more rigorous monitoring). 
 72. Farber, supra note 56, at 43. 
 73. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 51, at vi–xiii (presenting a pessimistic 
assessment of the HCP program); John Kostyack, Surprise!, 15 ENVTL. F., 
Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 19, 19–24 (presenting extensive criticism of the Babbitt 
Administration’s HCP reforms from an attorney for National Wildlife 
Federation); see generally Thornton, supra note 51, at 95–96 (describing other 
organizations’ criticisms). 
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participation in the HCP negotiation process.  By the late 
1990s, environmental groups had begun to complain that 
mitigation decisions in the HCP program were taking place 
without following “biological standards”—in other words, not 
according to the traditional permitting system—and to demand 
more public participation as a result.74  For example, in 1999 
the Defenders of Wildlife offered the following description of 
the HCP permitting process: 
Citizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in the 
HCP process except through the public comment period and, for some 
plans, through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or 
requirements of state or local law.  Often, by the time public meetings 
occur or official drafts are released for comment, however, both the 
regulated interests and the services have invested so much money 
and time in plan development that they are unlikely to change course. 
. . . [C]itizens (including those representing the environmental 
community) generally have not had a seat at the negotiating table in 
many major recent negotiations despite the fact that conservationists 
(in addition to FWS) represent the public’s interest in protecting 
endangered species. 
. . . 
. . . For the vast majority of plans . . . public participation was not 
adequate, given the plans’ large effects on public resources.  The most 
glaring examples are large-scale, single-landowner plans that 
significantly affect public resources . . . .  While those plans did have 
public meetings and/or formal comment periods, the conservation 
strategies resulted from private negotiations with largely token 
attempts at listening to the public’s concerns.  In addition, numerous 
small-scale HCPs reviewed here involved exclusive negotiations 
between the landowner and FWS . . . . 
. . . 
. . . This lack of public participation has resulted from an absence of 
formal requirements to involve the public and the limited leverage of 
citizens who do not have a direct financial stake in negotiations.75 
A similar theme emerged with respect to the interplay 
between HCP adaptive management and the parallel objective 
of providing fairness to landowners.  Another policy the Babbitt 
administration introduced to the HCP process, the so-called 
“No Surprises” provision, was designed to relieve the HCP 
                                                          
 74. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 51, at 59-61, 80-81 (1998) (summarizing 
Defenders of Wildlife’s critique of HCP program). 
 75. HOOD, supra note 51, at 41, 43-44; see also Holly Doremus, Preserving 
Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act 
Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1999) (examining the growing tension 
between the HCP and other ESA reform programs and public participation 
values). 
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permit holder of any additional conservation obligations beyond 
those specified in the HCP regarding unforeseen circumstances 
that arise after the HCP is issued.76  The policy was not 
popular with environmental protection interest groups, which 
argued that the No Surprises policy may constrain the use of 
adaptive management, as it cuts off revision of prior 
agreements about the HCP’s conservation measures.77 
On the other hand, one might just as reasonably observe 
that adaptive management undermines the No Surprises 
policy, as the very purpose of adaptive management is to 
ensure the ability to adjust decisions after the HCP is issued.  
But a third view is that the two policies can be implemented as 
complementary, not conflicting.78  The No Surprises policy 
simply defines who is responsible for measures necessary to 
address unforeseen circumstances.  Additionally, a 
comprehensive, criteria-specific adaptive management 
provision in an HCP negates the argument that matters 
contemplated as adaptive management were unforeseen for 
purposes of the No Surprises policy.  It should be in the 
interests of the agency and the applicant, therefore, to 
negotiate an adaptive management provision that spells out its 
                                                          
 76. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998).  The policy has been described as an essential 
component of the HCP program, necessary to make HCPs attractive to 
landowners.  See Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional 
Mandate for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717-19 (1997). 
 77. See Doremus, supra note 21, at 72–73.  Indeed, in recent litigation 
brought to challenge the No Surprises Rule, a federal district court identified 
procedural errors in the agency’s rule promulgation.  See Spirit of the Sage 
Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003).  The court found that the 
FWS did not follow proper notice and comment procedures in promulgating 
the so-called Permit Revocation Rule, which explains how and when the FWS 
can revoke a permit when it is evident continued use of the permit would 
violate the ESA.  Id. at 92.  Because the agency made the Permit Revocation 
Rule an integral component in its substantive defense of the previously-
adopted No Surprises Rule, the court also remanded the No Surprises Rule 
even though it was adopted through proper notice and comment procedures.  
Id.  Yet, the court declined to vacate or enjoin implementation of the No 
Surprises Rule itself and made no substantive findings on either rule.  In 
response, FWS reissued final rules governing incidental take permit 
revocations. See Endangered Species Act Incidental Take Permit Revocation 
Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,723 (Dec. 10, 2004).  The court has yet to rule on 
any of the substantive claims in the case, but presumably with the procedural 
defects resolved that phase of the litigation will resume. 
 78. For an additional discussion of this point, see J.B. Ruhl, Is the 
Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 935 n.221 
(2003). 
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scope and subject matter with clarity and precision.  Hence, 
with deliberate attention by the permitting agency to the 
contours and interplay of the adaptive management and No 
Surprises provisions of an HCP, the two policies seem perfectly 
capable of meeting their respective objectives.79 
Indeed, many HCPs issued after the No Surprises rule was 
enacted contain substantial adaptive management provisions 
that detail a comprehensive monitoring and adjustment 
protocol and specify the kinds of events and responses for 
which adjustments will be made.80  Nevertheless, the pressure 
for more public input on this and other aspects of HCP permits 
continued to build, culminating in a wave of litigation against 
specific HCP permits testing both the general validity of the 
agency’s HCP program policies and the agency’s particular 
application thereof. 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Interest groups did not waste time launching an assault on 
the HCP program, challenging the San Bruno Mountain HCP81 
on three claims that would appear time and again in later HCP 
                                                          
 79. See Jan S. Pauw & James R. Johnston, Habitat Planning Under the 
ESA on Commercial Forestlands, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 102, 104–05 
(2001) (suggesting the two policies are compatible). 
 80. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
202 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002).  This case involved an HCP issued in 
2001 to the LaCantera commercial development in San Antonio, Texas.  As 
discussed infra, the plaintiff environmental group challenged virtually every 
aspect of the permit, including the adequacy of the adaptive management 
provisions, but lost on every claim.  The court’s discussion of the adaptive 
management provisions emphasized the comprehensive and detailed nature of 
the monitoring and response protocols.  See id. at 616.  In the interest of full 
disclosure:  I served as a consultant to the HCP applicant in the case.  Another 
example is the elaborate thirty-five page adaptive management provision 
found in the HCP issued to Plum Creek Timber Company for 1.6 million acres 
of its timberland holdings in the Pacific Northwest, which include habitat of 
endangered fish.  See PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO., FINAL PLUM CREEK TIMBER 
COMPANY NATIVE FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 8-1 to 8-32 (Sept. 2000).  
More recently, FWS joined with other state and federal agencies to develop a 
detailed technical guidance for monitoring protocols to assist adaptive 
management in large-scale HCPs.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., 
DESIGNING MONITORING PROGRAMS IN AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT 
FOR REGIONAL MULTIPLE SPECIES CONSERVATION PLANS (2004), available at 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/pubs/monframewk10-04.pdf.  The No Surprises 
Rule, in other words, cannot be blamed for the withering of adaptive 
management in the HCP program. 
 81. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
RUHL_FINAL_136.DOC 01/09/2006  12:45:08 PM 
50 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:1 
 
challenges: First, FWS did not provide adequate support for its 
required finding that the HCP “will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival of the species,”82 second, the HCP did 
not “to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate 
the impacts” to the species,83 and third, the agency’s decision 
not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
under NEPA84 was not supported.  The court decided that 
HCPs should be reviewed similar to other environmental 
permits, under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of review,85 and found the agency’s 
permit acceptable on all claims under that standard. 
HCP litigation went into remission after this decision and 
did not resurface until after Babbitt’s reforms had taken hold.  
In 1998, a court found two FWS-issued HCP permits that 
allowed construction in the habitat of the Alabama beach 
mouse to be defective because of a lack of record evidence that 
the offsite habitat acquisition offered as mitigation was (1) 
adequately funded, (2) the maximum extent of mitigation 
practicable, or (3) consistent with mitigation required for other 
projects affecting the beach mouse.86  The court also found that 
FWS’s decision not to prepare a full-blown EIS under NEPA 
was unsupported because the finding of no significant impact 
was made “without any inventory or population data regarding 
how many of this declining endangered species exist elsewhere 
in the range, and without knowing how many of the species are 
being destroyed in the project site.”87 
Later, and on a much larger scale, a California district 
court held that FWS improperly issued an HCP permit 
authorizing development over 53,000 acres in the Natomas 
Basin area of northern California.88  The plaintiffs alleged FWS 
had inadequately considered factors relevant to the required 
determinations regarding the impact of the HCP on the species, 
the adequacy of mitigation, and the adequacy of funding.89  The 
court found many positive aspects of the plan as a whole, but 
                                                          
 82. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000); see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 976. 
 83. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 976. 
 84. See supra note 38; see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 981-82. 
 85. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000);  Jantzen, 706 F.2d at 981. 
 86. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1284-85 (S.D. Ala. 1998). 
 87. See id. at 1280-83. 
 88. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1302 (E.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
 89. See id. at 1284-85. 
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found flaws in the mechanics and implementation.90  On the 
other hand, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the 
plan did not include sufficient data regarding the species and 
was not scientifically sound.91  Thus, most of the biological 
aspects of the permit were upheld, including the amount of 
development allowed and mitigation required, but the 
implementation mechanics were deemed inadequate to attain 
those biological goals. The lead attorney for the National 
Wildlife Federation later proclaimed that “the effect of the 
ruling will likely be to produce more rigorous HCPs.” 92 
Several other cases have found HCPs lacking on 
procedural grounds.93  For example, one court held that FWS 
erred in issuing an HCP permit to a housing subdivision 
development in the habitat of an endangered squirrel species.94 
The agency failed to make certain critical information about 
the permit applicant’s mitigation plan adequately available for 
public comment.95  The agency also failed to make an 
independent finding that the applicant’s plan would minimize 
and mitigate harm to the species to the maximum extent 
practicable, as required by section 10(a)(1).96  It was not 
sufficient for the agency to rely on the applicant’s statements 
about the effects of mitigation without making an independent 
finding.97 
Similarly, another court preliminarily enjoined use of an 
HCP permit for a beach condominium development in 
                                                          
 90. A critical problem with the permit was that it covered an area 
encompassing many local jurisdictions, but the permit as approved included 
Sacramento as the only permittee.  See id. at 1298-99.  FWS improperly 
assumed other jurisdictions voluntarily would become permittees.  See id. at 
1291.  Also, the plan did not guarantee funding adequately because the 
development fee associated with the permit was inadequate and other 
jurisdictions that would need to impose the fee outside of Sacramento were not 
included.  See id. at 1293-95. 
 91. See id. at 1291. 
 92. John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and 
Imperiled Wildlife, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,712, 10,718 (2001). 
 93. See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sierra Club 
v. Norton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Ala. 2002). 
 94. See Gerber, 294 F.3d at 186. 
 95. See id. at 180-84. 
 96. See id. at 184-86. 
 97. FWS later corrected these procedural errors and reissued the permit.  
See Notice of Availability of Documents Associated with Winchester Creek 
Habitat Conservation Plan, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,609, 52,609-10 (Sept. 4, 2003). 
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endangered beach mouse habitat.98  The court found the permit 
deficient because FWS did not have sufficient information, or 
had not provided a sufficient explanation of the information it 
did have, to justify a finding that there would be no significant 
impact to the species and thus no EIS would be necessary 
under NEPA.99 
To be sure, some cases have upheld HCPs in the face of 
such challenges.  For example, against a barrage of claims that 
an HCP permit violated the ESA and NEPA, a court upheld the 
permit for commercial development in the range of several 
endangered karst-dwelling invertebrate species.100  The judge 
observed that “despite my personal lamentation about failing to 
nurture nature, my oath and the judicial process require 
decisions to be made within the parameters of the law.”101  On 
that basis he found, with meticulous documentation from the 
record responding to each claim by the plaintiffs, that FWS had 
acted within those parameters under both statutes.102 
In a more recent decision upholding an HCP for a 
development near the Sacramento airport, a court ruled that 
the permit issuance requirement that FWS must find the 
applicant has mitigated to the “maximum extent practicable” 
does not require the permittee to invest as much as it possibly 
can afford in mitigation measures such as habitat purchases.103  
Rather, endorsing the FWS policy on the question, the 
applicant need only mitigate the effects of its incidental take 
and “may do something less than fully minimize and mitigate 
the impacts of the take where to do more would not be 
practicable.”104  The court upheld the permit on all other 
grounds, including the adequacy of funding and the 
determination that the take would not jeopardize any of the 
covered species.105 
The won-loss record of the HCP litigation history is not 
nearly as important for my purposes as is the fact that there is 
                                                          
 98. See Sierra Club, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. 
 99. See id. at 1331-36. 
 100. See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202 
F. Supp. 2d 594, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2002). 
    101. Id. at 597. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-28 
(E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 104. See id. at 928. 
    105. See id. at 926-27. 
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a history of aggressive challenges to the program both at the 
policy level, such as in the litigation over the No Surprises 
Rule,106 and in the applied context, such as with individual 
permits.  Interest groups fearful of the flexible model of 
regulation the HCP program represents can fight it by 
nitpicking HCPs to death in the courts, where, notwithstanding 
the deferential standard of review required under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, judges appear all too willing to 
police the program closely.  As a consequence, the reward for 
agency willingness to experiment with adaptive 
implementation of the HCP program has been lawsuits and 
judicial admonitions, which do nothing to encourage agency 
personnel to exhibit “flexibility, openness, and their willingness 
to experiment, monitor, and adapt.”107 
Not surprisingly, practitioners also have become gloomy 
about the HCP program, suggesting its gradual ossification as 
litigation claims mount.108  One lawyer active in HCP permit 
application processing suggests that the agency’s “response to 
the handful of successful HCP challenges has been to fret 
endlessly over the documents and records, thus making the 
process much more burdensome. . . . The administrative 
burdens in doing HCPs are out of hand.”109  The agency, in 
other words, has sought refuge in the “front end” of 
administrative process, which can only spell doom for any hope 
that the adaptive “back end” will flourish.  Alas, regulation by 
adaptive management, while possible, seems impractical for 
agencies to manage in the long run under conventional rules of 
administrative law 
CONCLUSION—BUILDING A MODEL FOR REGULATION 
BY ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
As any policy response directed at the complex regulatory 
problems of the future will require, ecosystem management 
requires adaptive management as its method of 
implementation.  But truly adaptive management cannot 
flourish among regulatory agencies in the conventional 
administrative law context.  Legislatures, interest groups, and 
                                                          
 106. See supra note 77. 
 107. Grumbine, supra note 20, at 45. 
 108. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 51, at 98-101. 
 109. Email from Alan M. Glen, Partner, Smith, Robertson, Elliott, Glen, 
Klein & Bell L.L.P. to author (Mar. 9, 2005) (on file with the author). 
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courts have become acculturated to a “front-end” style of 
command-and-control regulation that has dominated for 
decades and is, to be candid, particularly suited to taking on 
discrete, readily-identified vectors of public harm.  Few 
observers believe that this model will have lasting success as 
problems such as invasive species, sprawl, and terrorism take 
hold as the primary transmitters of policy challenges.  Why 
then should anyone expect the implementation apparatus 
associated with command-and-control to be of much use either?  
As the National Research Council Committee studying the 
Missouri River concluded, adaptive management will “entail 
new governance structures.”110 
This is not to say that regulation by adaptive management 
demands a hands-off, free-wheeling culture of anything goes in 
so far as agency decision process is concerned.  But public 
participation and judicial review can come in many forms, so 
adaptive management need not be squeezed into the current 
conventions. Some observers suggest, for example, that 
adaptive management demands collaborative rather than 
confrontational forms of public participation, so as to foster the 
continuous relationships necessary for continuous 
adaptation.111  Some are skeptical.112  The fact is we do not yet 
know which, if any, constructs of collaboration work to promote 
regulation by adaptive management, or whether other means of 
public participation we have not thought of are even better 
suited.  Hence, the challenge for administrative law and policy 
is to devise and test new institutions and instruments of policy 
implementation that allow agencies to use adaptive 
management while ensuring adequate agency accountability. 
This effort is a work in process in its early stages.  We are 
far from ready to draft the National Adaptive Management Act!  
                                                          
 110. See MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM, supra note 14, at 112. 
 111. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age 
of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); cf. David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative 
State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 
OREGON L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2005).  See generally Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1997). 
 112. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997); 
Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the 
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000). 
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Yet the central objective for institutional design is quite 
apparent: decisionmakers need to be in a position to adjust 
decisions based on reliable monitoring feedback.  But they must 
do so in a manner that is transparent and accountable to the 
public, legislatures, and courts and which—here is the kicker—
is subject to some objective boundaries. 
The boundaries question poses the more difficult 
institutional design problems.  By relying more on adaptive 
“back-end” decision adjustment processes, adaptive 
management presents two potential sources of concern.  One, 
which I call “volatility,” is that an agency might alter its initial 
decision too substantially too soon after making the initial 
decision.  A small adjustment made soon after the initial 
position is implemented is understandable, but a radical 
departure made quickly after the initial position suggests that 
the agency’s operational model is faulty, its monitoring is 
defective, or something else about the agency’s approach is 
fundamentally flawed, and that the agency needs to go back to 
the drawing board.  The other problem, which I call “drift,” is 
the concern that an accumulation of small adjustments over 
time may put the agency so far from its initial position that it is 
appropriate to demand that the agency pause and conduct a 
top-to-bottom review of its objectives, models, monitoring, and 
so on. 
Volatility and drift present the concerns that require the 
construction of objective boundaries the legislature must 
express, the public may monitor, and the courts must police.  
The boundaries must be defined sharply enough so an agency 
will know when it is acting within its adaptive management 
mandate and when it has transgressed the mandate and thus 
made itself subject to a “front-end” reassessment of its adaptive 
management regime.  Conceptually, therefore, the following 
model of regulation by adaptive management illustrates the 
challenge for administrative law reform: 
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As this Article has demonstrated, administrative law does 
not have much experience with this sort of institutional 
structure, one which focuses on what the agency does after 
rather than before establishing its initial position.  Indeed, the 
Initial 
agency 
position 
Deviation  
from initial 
agency  
position 
Time from initial agency position 
Boundary of acceptable drift 
Boundary of acceptable volatility 
B 
A
C 
Defining Boundaries for Volatility and Drift:  The 
institutional structure of adaptive management must clearly 
define instances of volatility, in which the agency has deviated 
from its initial position too dramatically over the short-term 
(decision path line A), and instances of drift, in which the 
agency has slowly over time moved substantially away from its 
initial position (decision path line B), while still protecting the 
agency from obtrusive public participation and judicial review 
when it has neither acted with too much volatility nor drifted 
too far off course (decision path line C). 
RUHL_FINAL_136.DOC 01/09/2006  12:45:08 PM 
2005] REGULATION BY ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 57 
 
conventions of administrative law resist even exploring the 
possibilities.  It will be essential, therefore, for advocates of 
adaptive management to move beyond defining the need for 
and basic approach of adaptive management and begin working 
directly and aggressively with the institutional design 
questions.  Regulation by adaptive management is possible, 
even inevitable, but hard work lies ahead to make it so. 
 
